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ARTICLE 
Indexation and beyond: Australian wage 
determination 1978-1982 
David Plowman* 
Australia abandoned wage indexation in July 1981. The author examined in an earlier 
article, the operation of wage indexation from 1975 to June 1978. In this paper he reviews 
its operation from June 1978 until its abandonment. He discusses Australian wage deter-
mination in the per,iod since July 1981 and examines future options. 
An earlier article in this journal examined the implementation and operation of wage 
indexation in Australia from its inception in April 1975 Until June 1978. (Plowman, 1978). 
In that article it was argued that wage indexation could be regarded as having gone through 
three phases: 
.... the early tentative trial period (April 1975 to May 1976) in which gaining 
acceptance and compliance were the Commission's major concerns; the period 
from May 1976 to June 1978 in which plateau and partial forms of indexation 
enhanced the deflationary attributes of indexation; and the period of review and 
transfor1nation following the June 1978 National Wage Case leading to different 
principles of wage dete1·1nination ... (Plowman, 1978, p. 1 09). 
At that time of writing, the June 1978 guidelines had not been announced and the 
paper concentrated on the first two phases. The first parts of this paper review the opera-
tion of indexation from June 1978 until its abandonment in July 1981. The sections 
after that examine wage determination in the period since July 1981. The final section of 
the paper discusses possible future wage policy options. 
The Mark III ~Guidelines 
The guidelines implemented in June 1978 introduced three important changes to the 
then existing principles. First, quarterly indexation was replaced by a system of half-yearly 
indexation. Hearings were to be held in the months of April and October following the 
publication of the appropriate Consumer Price Index (CPI). Second, the Full Bench 
announced the abandonment of plateau indexation, which was the predominant form of 
indexation in Phase 11. This reflected growing concern with the compression of relativities 
resulting from plateau indexation. In using plateau indexation Full Benches attempted to 
reduce wages in a manner which would protect the incomes of lower wage earners. The 
distortion of established and jealously· guarded relativities was not conducive to industrial 
peace. The Mark Ill guidelines provided for uniform percentage increases - either full or 
partial . 
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The third change was the semi-pe1mane.aey afforded indexation. Up until June 1978, 
the Commission had refused to commit itlalf beyoad a quarter by quarter review of wage 
and price movements. The Mark m Guidelines wete to operate until the end of 1979, when 
they were to be reviewed. This semi-permanency no doubt relocted the Commission's 
greater confidence in the role of national wqe cases; the unexpected longevity of the 
indexation system; submissions by the major parties seeking continuance of a central-
ised system; and their inability to provide a viable alternative. In retrospect this confidence 
was not well based. By June 197~ the Commission was on the brink of abandoning index-
ation. 
Three national wage cases were handed down under the Mark III guidelines: December 
1978, June 1979, and January 1980. The result of these, and all the national wage cases 
held under wage indexation, are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1 Natio711ll Wage Cases under wage indexation 
Quarter Wage Variation 
Mark I Guidelines (April1975- May 1976) 
1975 March Full 3.6% 
June Full 3.5% 
September none 
December Full 6.4% 
Mark II Guidelines (May 1976- June 1978) 
1976 March Full 3.0% to $125 p.w. 
1977 
June 
September 
December 
March 
June 
September 
December 
Flat $3.80 thereafter. 
Full 2.5% to $98 p. w. 
Flat $2.50, $98- $166 p.w. 
Partia11.S% thereafter. 
Full 2.2% 
Flat $2.90 for Medibank 
Partial2.8% to $100 p.w. 
Flat $2.80 thereafter. 
Partial 1.9% to $200 p. w. 
Flat $2.80 thereafter. 
Partial 2.0% 
Partial 1. 5% 
Partiall.5% to $170 p.w. 
Flat $2.60 thereafter. 
1978 March Full1.3% 
Mark III Guidelines (June 1978- March 1980) 
1978 June/September Full4.0% 
1979 December 1978/March Partial3.2% 
June/September Partia14.5% 
Mark IV Guidelines (March 1980- April1981) 
1980 December 1979/March Partia14.2% 
June/September Partia13.7% 
Mark V Guidelines (April 1981 -July 1981) 
1981 December 1980/March (80%) Partial 3.6% 
Indexation abandoned July 31 
CPI Increase 
3.6% 
3.5% 
0.8% 
5.6% 
3.0% 
2.5% 
2.2% 
6.0% 
2.3% 
2.4% 
2.2% 
2.3% 
1.3% 
4.0% 
4.0% 
5.0% 
5.3% 
4.7% 
4.5% 
Source: Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commilsion, National Wage Caae Decilions 
(various dates). 
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In the decision of June 1979, the Full Bench considered e 
ruefully observed that "one side wants indexation without restraints other 
without indexation'' (NWC, June 1979. p.9). It noted that an orderly 
could not survive on a voluntary basis unless commitment was by all 
parties. This commitment was not forthcoming. Union councils and their affiliates had 
authorised wage campaigns in defiance of the guidelines. This resulted not only in an inc-
rease in the number of industrial disputes but also a wages drift- the difference between 
award and actual wages - of 2.5 percent. Employers had not been supportive of indexation 
and had not been prepared to resist wage increases outside the guidelines. In many instanc-
es they had entered into contrived arrangements for pay increases which they expected the 
Commission to endorse. 
The Federal Government had not played the role expected of it by the Commission. 
Important supportive mechanisms, such as the Prices Justification Tribunal and tax index-
ation had been removed or made ineffectual. Income tax rates had been increased, thereby 
placing furtller pressures on wage demands. Government "policy induced" price rises had 
adversely affected the CPI and contributed an average some 2.25 percentage points to the 
Consumer Price Index ( CPI) for each of the years 1975 to 1979 (PlowJnan, 1982, pp.l 58-160) 
The movement to petroleum import parity pricing, together with price ting 
from the September budget, contributed 1.9 percentage points out of the 2.3 percent CPI 
rise for the December 1978 quarter. 'The CPI was discounted for the effects of the import 
parity pricing of petroleum (i.e. 0.8 percent), and a conference called to decide the future 
of indexation. Unless some consensus could be achieved, the Bench considered ''there 
was little point in persisting with the indexation package" (NWC, June 1979, p.9). 
The conference did not produce consensus. Employers continued to aque that the 
wage-price nexus should be abandonned in favour of a productivity-geared sy tem. 
'The ACTU called for full indexation with the right to bargain collectively. these 
polar positions, the Commonwealth Government's movement away from its advocacy of 
''zero indexation" (a contradiction in tetins) may have been sufficient encouragement for 
the Commission to press on. The Government advocated a package which called for auto-
matic six monthly indexation "for the CPI discounted for the effects of Commonwealth 
Government induced price rises". 'This package amounted to partial indexation of about 
60 percent of the CPI movement. 
This was not a particularly attractive offer to unions. Nonetheless, it narrowed the 
gap between the Commonwealth and ACTU submissions. Indexation limped on. Partial 
indexation of 4.5 percent was awarded in January 1980 following a 5.0 percent CPI 
incteue; petroleum import parity pricing again accounting for the discount. In March 1980 
a fourth set of guidelines were introduced . 
• 
The Mut IV Guidelines 
The miQor a1nendments introduced in March 1980 concerned the CommUDity Catch-
up proriliODS (Principle 7b) and the Work Value provisions (Principle 7a). The Community 
Catch-up prorilions fo1med part of the original guidelines and were inteacled to ensure that 
the waae of particular awards were appropriately set for indexation purp The 
claimed that, as a result of a series of industry award wage to 1974, a 
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firnt base had been established for indexation. Principle 7(b) provided a mechanism for 
resolving disputes in which unions claimed that their award rates had not been appropriate-
ly adjusted in light of the community movements of 1974. This movement, in practice, 
was translated to mean a flow-on of the $24 awarded under the Metal Industry Award u 
a flat (i.e. non-proportional) increase (NWC, September 1975, pp. S-6). By its very nature 
Principle 7(b) was intended as a short te1m measure. The Mark III guidelines gave unions 
until the end of December 1978 to lodge any outstanding catch-up claims. The Mark IV 
guidelines formally dispensed with these catch-up provisions. 
Provision had existed in all sets of guidelines for work value changes under principle 
as ''changes in work value arising from changes in the nature of the work, sldll and respon-
sibility required, or the conditions under which the work is performed" (NWC. March 
1980, p. 38). 
Notwithstanding restrictions placed upon the use of principle 7(a), it was difficult to 
employ it in a way which did not upset established relativities. In June 1979 the Full 
Bench pointed out that: 
Over the past twelve months, driver classifications under numerous awards .have 
received the same or similar increases, general increases have been granted to air-
craft industry workers, airline transport workers, stevedoring industry, oil and 
paint industry employees ... It is clear that an ever increasing range of occupa-
tions in an ever widening range of industries is receiving increases which conform 
to a fairly standard pattern (NWC, June 1979, p. 3-4). 
The genesis of this pattern of standard wage increases was the Transport Award Work 
Value Case, completed in December 1978, which awarded driver classifications wage 
increases of $8 per week. Despite the Commission's cautionary note that his case was not 
to establish a precedent for other transport awards, movements of identical or similar 
rates took place, initially in transport awards and then in other awards. By November 1979 
the ''work value" wave had flowed through the transport, oil, aluminium, manufacturing, 
gas, aircraft, banking, vehicle assembling, liquor trades, building, metal trades, glass, steve-
doring, dry cleaning and bread baking industries. By July 1980, some 34 per~ent of award 
wage and salary earners had received "work value" flow-ons. By April 1981, 80 percent of 
the workforce had received similar increases (NWC, April 1981, p.32). A selective, micro 
avenue of wage adjustments had been converted into a general wage increase. 
An important element in the awarding of generalised work value increases was the use 
of the "averaging" or "levelling down" process. The averaging process was one in which 
all award classifications were granted wage increases on account of work value changes 
experienced by some classifications in the award. The averaging process supposedly result 
in lower increases than ''justified" for some classifications and higher increases than '~ust­
ified" for others. And supposedly, the overall increase in the wages bill was equivalent to 
or not more than, that which would have been the case if only those "meriting" work value 
changes had received them. Given uniform rates of increase in various industries it became 
clear that the averaging process - which was contrary to the wording of Principle 7(a), 
which stated that work value changes would norn1ally apply to only some classifications 
within an award - had an eye to comparative wage justice rather than to wage costs. 
The use of the averaging process is illustrated by the Metal Industry Work Value Case 
completed in November 1979 (Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 1979). 
Williams J. undertook the daunting task of inspecting an industry which contains in excess 
of 10,000 establishments, over 600,000 employees and an award with some 340 classific-
ations, in just over two months. Thirty-eight companies were inspected an4 approximately 
one third of the award classifications evaluated. The inspections showed that some work 
value changes had occurred, but not in all areas: 
In one or two of the smaller establishments inspected there has been little chanse 
in the nature of the work being performed by employees. On the other hand, in 
some of the large mass production shops there has been a substantial degree of 
investment in new machines and in changed methods of production which has led 
to a necessity for many employees to adjust to the new technologies and proced-
ures involved ... In the industry as a whole there have been changes brought 
about by new technology and work practices which in turn have led to increased 
work value. These increases have not bee~ uniforn1 and have penetrated to a diff-
ering extent from establishment to establishment and between classifications 
(Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 1979, pp. 53-54). 
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Under the Mark IV Guidelines, two national wage cues were heard, In July 1980, the 
.,.... handed down its decision in relation to the CPI for the December 
1979 and March 1980 quarters. The Full Bench awarded an of 4.2 percent after 
dhcounting 0.6 percentage points on account of import petroleum parity pricing aad 0.5 
pereeatqe points on account of the economic costs of industrial disputes and work value 
wage increases. The second case was completed in January 198l.It considered wage move-
ments on account of CPI increases of 4.7 percent. The Full Bench again awarded partial 
iadexation by discounting the index 0. 7 percentage points for the direct effects of the 
government's on levy and by 0.3 percentage points on account of the indirect effects of 
thk policy. This was the fust occasion in which the Bench discounted for the indirect 
effects. It has overcome its previous aversion to "double counting" and the imposition of 
the total effects of the on levy on wage earners. 
The 1981 Principles Review and the Mark V Guidelines 
The January 1981 decision was of greater significance than the mere discountiq of 
the indirect effects of the oil levy. The decision also took note of the pressures upon 
indexation and contemplated bringing the system to an end. The Bench stated that ''the 
system in its present for1n had broken down ... (and) it would be idle to pretend other-
wise". The level of industrial disputation, and output losses, had continued, in the FuJI 
Bench's view, at an unacceptably high level. In particular, industrial action in support of 
the 3 S hour week campaign was considered ''inconsistent with any reasonable interpret-
ation of the restraint inherent in the principles". Another important factor was the "str-
onsJy conflicting and iiieconcilable expectations among the major participants" and their 
'ucompatible attitudes and expectations". Unions saw indexation as an effe ·ve base 
from which to launch other gains by way of direct negotiations. Employer organisations 
continued to press for the abandonment of the price-wage nexus and the adoption of some 
"capacity to pay" criterion that would have by-passed Principle I, which gave substance to 
the term ''indexation". The Commonwealth had only given lip service support to index-
ation and had argued the case for semi-automaticity at the wage-fixing principles confer-
ences of 1978-9, It had then reverted to "zero indexation" submissions at national wage 
cases. The Bench decided to abandon the existing guidelines and call a conference to exa-
m;ne the future of wage fiXation. Should the conference be unproductive, the Bench 
proposed conducting a public inquiry. The major issue of the conference wu to be the 
future of a centralised wage fixing system: 
In essence, the issues to be resolved on the future of wage determination would 
be whether there should be a centralised system or not, what the character of the 
system should be and what principles if any should apply to each. Consideration 
related to a decentralised system would need to have regard to the question as 
to whether such a system should include periodic national wage adjustment and/ 
or deter1nination of a national wage case. (NWC, January 1981, p.6). 
Following the failure of the conference to make satisfactory progress, the President of 
the Commission announced that a public inquiry would be held. On April 7, the Full 
Bench delivered its decision with respect to this inquiry. The decision was notable for three 
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things: the continuance of a centralised system of waae determination in the form of 
indexation; an alteration in the way in which national wage adjustments were to take place; 
and a refusal to loosen the guidelines with respect to wage adjustments outside of those 
deterntined at national wage cases. 
Despite its fear the wage indexation was breaking down, the Full Bench found that 
the major parties were unanimous in supporting the maintenance of a centralfsed system 
of wage deterntination "operating on a set of principles with national wage adjustments as 
the main source of wage increases". The parties differed over the fo1m of the centralised 
system and over the degree of centralisation. While the Full Bench welcomed this support, 
it was less certain of the support a centralised system would receive from employers and 
unions in the field 1 . The Bench indicated that if the tenets of its centraUsed system were 
not adhered to it would abandon wage indexation: 
. . . we have given serious consideration to departing from the . . . system and 
reverting to the less structured arrangements which prevailed prior to 30 April 
1975. The Commission should not try to operate a centralised system which is 
doomed to immediate failure ... We are encouraged by the unanimous support 
for an orderly centralised system but we are not convinced that there is sufficient 
recognition of the responsibilities such a system imposes on all participants 
involved in settlements at the establishment and industry level (NWC, Aprill981, 
p.8). 
The Full Bench urged all the parties to show greater commitment and support than 
had been the case in the past. The Bench declared that "it is self-evident that there can be 
no coherent and meaningful centralised system unless the principles are generally complied 
with. We affirtn therefore that substantial compliance is the keystone of the package we 
propose." (NWC, April 1981, p.37). 
Since its inception, the indexation system reaffirtned the prices plus productivity 
forntula adopted in the 1961 National Wage Case. No productivity reviews, however, had 
been pursued. The April 1981 principles incorporated a time table for the hearing of any 
productivity case. A productivity hearing was to be processed at the second of two national 
wage cases. The first of these (the first review) was to be held following the publication of 
the March quarter CPl. At this review the Commission was to adjust award wages for 80 
percent of the movement in the preceding December and March quarters CPI "other than 
in exceptional and compelling circumstances". One such fust review took place in May 
1981 when the Full Bench granted a 3.6 percent wage increase on account of a CPI 
increase of 4.5 percent for the previous two quarters. The second case (the fmal review) 
was to be held following the publication of the September quarter CPI and was to consider 
award wage increases on account of three factors: the 20 percent residue from the first 
review; the CPI increases for the June and September quarters; and national productivity 
increases. It appears that the relevant productivity movements considered appropriate were 
those of the preceding year, rather than productivity movements not compensated for 
since the introduction of indexation (NWC, April 1982, pp. 26-27). 
The Full Bench concluded that ''there is agreement ... that productivity should be 
distributed nationally rather than on an industry basis" (NWC, April 1982. p.24 ). While the 
parties to the Inquiry may have held this view, this appeared a sentiment not shared by 
employers and employees in productive industries. A weakness of the prices plus product-
ivity formula, specifically, the productivity side of the fortnula, has been that parties at the 
sector, industry or enterprise level have not been prepared to wait for irregular and general-
ised productivity increases. The work value round, described earlier, with across-the-board 
wage increases, took on the characteristics of a decentralised productivity review. Product-
ivity hearings in the final review may have been an attempt to create regular productivity 
adjustments, which, in turn, may have lessened wage pressures in the field. 
In reformulating the principles, the Commission chose to toughen its stance in support 
of a centralised system, and to reject those elements of decentralisation which had been 
proposed or which had previously crept into the system. The Full Bench reaffumed that 
wage increases outside national wages cases must be kept to a minimum and declared: 
1 Neither peak union councils nor peak employer bodies have power or authority over their affiliates. 
The degree of de facto control that federal and state governments have over statutory authorities is 
also unclear. 
• 
• 
d l . 
Yst 
en~ 
Tafu 
.. 
PPor 
rs ~ 
w 
rn y, • 
d 
ril 
• 
IS 
rt 
nt 
ts 
) 
thr 
can • 
phe 
age \\~ 
r, had 
of an, 
tiona. 
• 10no 
for 8G 
r thar 
n Ma\ 
• 
a CPI 
e' JeV! 
ns1d.; 
e frrst 
cth 1t 
• 
·e \\ere 
ed fo: 
uld be 
ile the 
ed by 
·oduct· 
at the 
nera1· 
-board 
oduct· 
ctivitY 
pport 
been 
d that 
Jared 
the of 
e made it cleu that if illcreases in 
utional wap adjustmen , they would --.. 
iD at the final review. 
and a,,., 
It Is conceivable that these economic manifestations (movemen 
wap cuea) may call for discounting of such mapitude u to leave or noth-
inl to be awarded by way of national wase. It would not be in the 
to give protection to real wages on which the aive the • 
est priority. Such a result should not be regarded u a punitive act by the Commi-
ssion but rather as a sign that a critical requirement of a ceatraJiaes system in 
respect of costs has been so violated as to leave nothing to be di•bibuted by way 
of national wage (NWC, April1981, p.S8). 
for 
For particular unions or workers taking part in protracted disputes, the Full Bench fore-
shadowed the witholding of national wage increases. The Bench stated that "the Princ-
iples must apply uniformly and consistently to all our awuds. Those who refuse to comply 
with the rules should not expect to receive the benefits which flow from the rules". (NWC, 
April1981, p.S8). 
Post-Review Pressures and the Abandonment of Indexation 
The April 1981 decision envisaged that the new principles would operate for two 
yean. The new guidelines came under such pressure, however, that the Commission &ban-
donned them in July 1981. In the view of some, the new guidelines reflected too closely 
the system advanced by the federal government at the national wage conference. This made 
the new guidelines less acceptable to unions. 
Indeed, the new guidelines did mirror rather closely the submissions made by the 
Commonwealth Government. The Full Bench's acceptance of these submissions, and its 
modelling of the new guidelines on those recommended by the Commonwealth, probably 
resulted from several factors. First, the Commonwealth's submissions were ex con-
structive. While the other major parties were prepared to reiterate polarised positions which 
had come to depict their attitudes under indexation, the Commonwealth wu prepared to 
make considerable concessions. Its acceptance of 80 percent automatic indexati at the 
first review was in sharp contrast to its espousal of "zero indexation" at previous national 
wage cases. The Commonwealth submissions took into account both the industria) rela-
tions and economic requirements of national wage determination. Earlier Government sub-
missions had been sadly lacking in their appreciation of the first requirement. Secondly, 
the Government submissions did provide for a practical method of considerins both the 
industrial relations and economic attributes of indexation. A short fust review with near 
full indexation, followed by a second review in which more detailed submissions were 
made, added to the Commission's flexibility and ability to discount in in more acceptable 
manner. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the Commission may have hoped to place 
more responsibility onto the Government for the effectiveness of indexation by adoptina 
its suggested foitnat. Since the election of the Fraser Government in 1975, the Commission 
and the Commonwealth found themselves on collision courses with respect to indexation. 
The Commonwealth line was that indexation maintained an artificiany high wage level 
which impeded the Government's strategy for economic recovery. The Commission com-
plained that the emasculation by the Government of the indexation supporting 
mechanisms (particularly tax indexation, the Prices Justification Tribunal, "policy induced 
2 For a of Australian productivity bargaining, see Ri•ch and Howard (1973) and 
Gaudroa (1981). 
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price rises", and "zero indexation") ha4 frustrated bldexattoa•s economic and industrial 
relations potential. Over the period 1975 - 1980 the Commt•ion had become a useful 
scapegoat for the Government's inability to honour its election promise of "turning on the 
lights". Further, the Government had placed severe obstacles in the path of indexation 
which had contributed to the system beins bought to the b1lnk of abandonment. In 
opting for the Government's subJutsajon, the Commission may well have sought greater 
co-operation from the Government, and more specificaBy, may have sought to give the 
Government more autonomy and hence responsibility for wages policy. It is worth noting 
that the onlr post indexation national wage review of note also adopted the government's 
submission. 
If the new guidelines, based upon Government submissions, were designed to secure 
greater Government co-operation and involvement, they were singularly unsuccessful: 
Within a month of the new guidelines, the Federal Government announced its 
intention to conduct a wide-ranging jnquiry into wage deterJnination and indust-
rial relations ... This followed on an even earlier decision to hire consultants to 
examine possible amendments to the Conciliation and Arbitration Act. Govern-
ment support for the new guidelines thus appeared limited to their role as a 
further string in a wage restraint bow. Indeed, the extent to which the original 
atmosphere of indexation had been undermined by mid-1981 was reinforced by 
decisions of the Government's Razor Gang which reported in March. The Prices 
Justification Tribunal and policies of tax indexation were formally scrapped, only 
to be followed later in the year by the fmal abandonment of Medibank. If the 
growing trade union dissatisfaction with wage indexation had not been strong by 
mid-1980, decisions to abolish indexation's three original 'supporting mechanisms' 
could be almost guaranteed to spell the end of union reliance on indexation quide-
lines (Wright, 1982, p. 72). 
Parliamentary salary increases, the 35 hour working week campaign, the independent 
action of two state industrial tribunals, and the impact of two major wage disputes, even-
tually brought about the collapse of indexation. 
While arguing for wage restraint, including "zero indexation" for the majority of 
workers before the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, the Government took 
different action in relation to the salaries of members of parliament before the Renumer-
ation Tribunal. The Government approved the 20 percent increase in the salaries of 
members of parliament (with higher increases for ministers) recommended by the 
Renumeration Tribunal in May 1981. Wage restraint, it seemed, did not apply to Canberra! 
A subsequent Cabinet decision to defer half the increases to a later date was a classic case 
of closing the gates after the horses had been stampeded out of the wages stable! 
The shorter working week campaign conducted by unions in a number of industries, 
principally the metal trades industry, put considerable pressure on the system of central-
ised wage determination. The indexation guidelines were adjusted in September 1978 to 
accommodate union pressure for a shorter working week. Principle 6 stated: 
Each year the Commission will consider what increase in the total wage or changes 
in conditions of employment sliould be awarded nationally on account of 
productivity. 
The inclusion of the word "nationally" was to remove the growing trend to enterprise or 
industry-wide productivity bargaining. Such sectional bargaining was considered by the 
Full Bench as incompatible with the national system of adjustment in which equity was a 
paramount ~onsideration. At the national level, the ACTU could argue for reduced working 
hours on account of productivity. Union strategy, however, was a ''divide and conquer" 
one and sought to gain reduced working hours in select areas from which flow-ons could 
be subsequently secured. This resulted in considerable strike action which breached an 
important component of the substantial compliance requirement of indexation. The 
shorter working week campaign helped generate an industrial relations mlleau in which 
3 At this review, completed in May 1982, the Commission refused to return to a centralised systmn 
of wage determination requested by the ACTU and opposed by the Commonwealth and mnployen. 
It should be noted that the Australian Constitution does not enable the Commonwealth to directly 
control wages and prices. 
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In July 1981, both the South Australian and Western Australia• Industrial~· 
adopted approaches which were incompatible with the fedoral pi outh 
Australia the Industrial Commission awarded full indexation (u t the "tint review" 
principle of 80 percent indexation) to lower-paid workers. This decision created two 
problems: it generated relativity distortions between federal a~Jd state award employees 
(and it should be appreciated that employees under both sets of awards often work side by 
side in Australian enterprises), and it raised again the traumas associated with plateau 
indexation which the Federal Commission had been forced to abandon. Most importantly, 
it signalled the unwillingness of a state industrial tribunal to follow in the wake of a federal 
system patently in demise. 
The guidelines adopted by the West Australian Industrial Commission were also 
sufficiently different as to be the cause of potential difficulties. In its guidelines the West 
Australian Commission accepted comparative wage justice as a basis for wage claims and 
also expressed a willingness to permit productivity bargaining over shorter working hours. 
The acceptance of comparative wage justice was a significant departure from the federal 
approach. Under its guidelines the federal Commission had rejected the relevance of com-
parative wage justice, rather derisively referred to as "that principle which means all things 
to all men", for wage adjustments under indexation. Again, the break of the West Aust-
ralian Commission from the Federal Commission's wage principles probably reflected the 
fo11ner's assessment of the increasing impotence of the national guidelines. In addition to 
these actions by industrial tribunals, the New South Wales Government amended the 
Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 to remove any barriers to parties negotiating reduced 
working hours. Thus, this state government signalled its acceptance of productivity bargain-
• mg. 
Major wage disputes further heightened and aided the collapse of indexation. Two very 
important disputes in this respect concerned Telecom Australian and the Transport 
Worker's Union. In each case, management and the unions concerned were prepared to 
enter into agreements which breached the guidelines and then expect the Commission to 
certify the agreement. Certification, which has the effect of giving the agreement the same 
legal status as a deter1nination of the Commission, was an important factor in the transport 
dispute. Cartage contracts in this industry usually provide for rise and fall clauses in rela-
tion to wage increases approved by the Commissiolf. In the case of Telecom, Commission 
approval was a ploy to get the Government itself off the hook. In this case, management of 
the statutory authority negotiated an agreement with unions after severe industrial disrup-
tion. The basis of the union's claims was the loss of parity of technicians with those 
employed in the private sector. The Government agreed to sanction the increases but only 
so long as the Commission gave its consent. A Full Bench of the Commission, headed by 
the President, refused to ratify the agreement since it was in breach of the guideline. The 
Bench added, however, that it would be ''industrially naive" for Telecom not to pay the 
increases offered. The government was forced to agree to Telecom paying its 25,000 tech-
nicians increases ranging from SIS to $23 per week. As might have been expected, this 
induced relativity claims by other Telecom workers and by those employed by Australia 
Post, a statutory authority with established relativities with Telecom Australia. 5 On top 
of this, the ACTU and public-sector unions initiated campaigns to increase the wages of 
some 400,000 public-sector employees to comparable rates of their private-eector counter-
parts. 
4 This is discussed more fully in Plowman (1982) pp. 126-130. 
s Telecom Australia and Australia Post previously fonned the Post Master General's Department. 
Hence awud classifiCations and unions covering en1ployees are common to both authorities. 
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The accelerated break down of the sydela cau.aed the Victortm ~ for Labour 
and Industry to request the President of the Commiatfon to reeOD.Vene the National Wqe 
Case Bench as a matter of urgency. This t claimed to have "been alarmed at · 
developments". It noted that ''m.Uor participants and indeed certain membom of the 
Commission have taken positions which are inconsistent with the operations of a central-
ised system". This comment, no doubt, wu at Commi'lkmer Qambon who, in 
mediating in the Telecom dispute, the parties might cODidder re•OYins them-
selves out of the indexation system. The Minister added: "The climate hu dram-
atically in recent weeks of decisions in the CommjMion, enancted, and 
statements by members of the Commission, unions and employer ". As a 
result, the public sector in Victoria had been served with a number of claims relating to 
wages, conditions and hours of work, and serious problems existed as to how such claims 
should be resolved. The Minister's letter continued: 
Never before in the history of wage indexation have there been so many instances 
of non-compliance with the Commission's principles, although it is the under-
standing of the Victorian Government that all parties, including membem of the 
Commission are bound to observe those principles. In the Telecom the 
Commission indicated that it would be industriaJJy naive of the employer not to 
implement the agreement which had been reached. In the opinion of the Victor-
ian Government, this is tantamount to the Commission acknowledging that relief, 
in the sense of resolution of claims which breach the guidelines, is now available 
to those parties which are prepared to negotiate without the Commissions's impri-
matur. 
Accordingly the expectations created by the Commission's comments on the 
Telecom settlement has been fueled by the unions demanding settlement of 
disputes outside the system. Thus the credibility of the Commission's principles 
is now being underntined. 
If unions presist in seeking resolution of disputes in this way the State of Victor-
ia faces industrial chaos by virtue of its commitment to the principles. The Go-
vernment has supported the authority of the Conciliation and Arbitration Comm-
ission and its centralised wage fiXation system. Clearly, however, the system has 
been imperilled by recent events. 
The Victorian Government perceives a rapidly developing industrial vacuum and 
in the circumstances requests that the National Wage Case Bench reconvene as a 
matter of urgency to address itself to this most serious situation.' 
The National Wage Full Bench was reconvened in the context of thel Transport 
Workers' dispute. The Australian Road Transport Federation and the Transport Workers' 
Union agreed upon wage increases in the vicinity of $20 per week subject to ratification 
by the Commission. The Commission was not prepared to ratify the agreement and the 
union called a national stoppage. At the Conference, the govenment, which had been free 
in its criticism of the Commission's generous wage increases under the guidelines, now 
sought a relaxation of the guidelines in order to have the dispute settled quickly and enable 
the Prime Minister to attend an important overseas engagement -the royal wedding. The 
Commission rejected proposals by the ACTU and the Commonwealth that the strong 
pressures on the system could be accommodated by widening the Principles dealing with 
anomalies and inequities: 
The beleif that the answer lies in greater tlexibBity of the kind proposed is illus-
ory. Such flexibility would resolve sectional claims at the expense of national 
adjustments and destroy the priority expected of a centralised system. It cannot 
be otherwise (NWC, July 1981 ). 
Indexation was a ban donned on July 31st ushering in the government's prefe11ed option of 
a "policy of no policy". 
6 Letter from Mr Ramsay, Minister of Labour and Industry to President, Australian ConcDiation and 
Arbitration Commission, July 8, 1981. 
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round, in its initial taps at the time of writin& wm renegotiate the aareemeu. 
In the first round. As each set of negotiations have been undertaken in quite uu.lcr 
mnic circumstances, and have envolved different strategies, they have been out 
for the purpoaes of this paper. 
The Government expectation was that the abandonment of indexation would result 
in market forces determining different rates of increases in different industries and between 
different occupations, and in a reduction in the rate of wage increases. This may well be 
the final outcome of that state which economists pursue but never seem to arrive at- the 
long run. Wage movements during the first wages round, that is for the first 18 months 
following the abandonment of indexation, indicate that the Treasury penpective has not 
been the short run outcome. Wage movements have spread uniformly throughout most 
federal and state awards based upon the standards established by the Metal Trades Industry 
Agreement negotiated in December 1981. Those agreements which had been negotiated 
prior to the metal agreement, and which did not give increases matching those of the metal 
agreement (for example, the $20 settlement in the transport dispute mentioned above) 
were re-opened and resulted in further compensation, often at the "mid-term" adjust-
ment stage (see below). Other negotiations used the metal industry as the standard for 
negotiations and settled for comparable rates. The major factor differentiating award 
settlements related not so much to amount, as to the timing and method of settlement. 
Very depressed industries, such as the meat slaughtering and pastoral industries received 
their award adjustments eight to nine months after the metal industry agreement, and the 
settlements involved recourse to the Commission. In other industries (such as printing, 
pulp and paper and local government) flow-ons occured more quickly and by consent. 
The metal industry agreement which became the benchmark for other settlements 
had four major components: an immediate pay increase of $25 per week in the fitter's 
rate and proportionate pay increases (11.9 percent) for other award classifications; a 
further mid-ter1n adjustment of $14 a week for fitters (5.7 percent) from July 1, 1982; 
a reduction in the standard working week from 40 hours to 38 hours, effective from March 
1, 1982; and a "no further claims" clause for the period of agreement. Excluding the 
hourly rate increase resulting from reduced hourS', the 18.6 percent award wage increases 
for metal fitters in the 1 7 month period following the end of indexation compares with 
the 20 percent award wage increase (including an imputed 4 percent "work value" 
increase) in the last 25 months of indexation. If the hourly rate increase resulting from the 
shorter working week is included, award rate increases in the post indexation period to 
December 1982 were equivalent to increases gained under indexation in the period June 
1978 to July 1981. The abandonment of indexation did not result in market forces deter-
mining different rates in different industries, so much as in fairly unifo11n wage movements 
based on criteria relevant to the metal industry settlement. In its Budget Statement No 2, 
the Treasury, no friend of either indexation or the Conciliation and Arbitration Commiss-
ion, sees these post indexation developments as short te1m phenomena: 
After the abandonment of that framework in July 1981 (i.e. indexation) the 
working out of these (economic) pressures occulted largely through direct bar-
gaining on a more decentralised industry and award basis. The development of 
such decentralised wage bargaining arrangement is still embryonic and it is 
probable that some of the wage pressure evident in 1981-82 was due to the trans-
itional or hybrid nature of the arrangements then applying. In effect, we have 
been experiencing some of the costs usually associated with any "learning curve". 
But even the modest degree of liberation of wage setting from the shackles of the 
arbitral tribunals that has so far occurred appears to have moderated the speed 
of flow of wage increases and to have encouraged a greater sense of responsibility 
in industrial relations - as reflected, in a limited way, in the development of 
undertakings to make no further claims during the life of an agreement. 
7 Assuming no changes in productivity, overtime or employment, the reduced working week raised 
hourly rates by 5.3 percent. 
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Over the long term (and subject to appropriate policy settings), the change to 
more decentralised wage deter1nination arrangements should work to make wage 
levels more responsive to economic conditions and capacity to pay at the industry 
level - and should thus promote higher employment and lower unemployment. 
Whereas the centralised wage indexation system tended to maintain real wage 
levels (for those still fortunate enough to be in jobs) in the face of weak activity 
and high levels of unemployment, the industry bargaining approach should allow 
greater scope for wage settlements to respond to the need to restore industry 
profitability and hence, maintain employment levels. Particularly to the extent 
that this were to happen in key areas such as the metals industry, it would facil-
itate a more rapid slowing down in inflation and speedier recovery in activity and 
employment. The extent of the increased flexibility in the wage system remains, 
however, to be seen ... With the benefit of hindsight (the) bargaining process 
can be seen to be still far too ''centralised" (in this case, in the metal trades areas 
as a whole) to be able to take appropriate account of the interests of all units 
involved ... (Austra).ia, Department of the Treasury, 1982, p.52). 
This Treasury interpretation is at variance with the statistical information supplied in 
Statement No.2 which shows an acceleration in earnings from 9.9 percent in 1970-80 and 
13.5 percent in 1980-81 to 14.8 percent in 1981-82 (and, importantly, an increase in the 
annual rate from 13 percent in the first half of 1981-82 to 21 percent in the second half). 
It also begs the question as to what effects the institutional factors in the labour market are 
likely to have on wage detettnination. All things being equal one can expect that the down-
turn in demand and increased economic recession can be expected to reduce wage gains in 
1982-83. Whether the decentralised approach allows for greater scope for wage settlements 
to respond to the different needs of different industries depends on some of the other varia-
bles identified by the Treasury -the hybrid nature of arrangments (which, contrary to the 
Treasury view are not transitional but permanent arrangements), the appropriate policy 
settings, and the degree of flexibility (meaning decentralisation) which can be included 
in the ~ystem. The hybrid nature of the system, and the lack of genuine decentralisation, 
are likely to have an impact on the wage settlements currently being negotiated. Some of 
the factors relevant to the outcome of these negotiations are outlin,ed in the next section. 
The long term prospects for decentralisation or a return to centralised wage fixation will, 
I beleive, be determined at the political level. The final part of the paper discusses these 
prospects. 
Wage Negotiations- Round Two 
The parties move into the second round of negotiations with the same hybrid arrangements 
which operated in the earlier round and with an economy in much worse shape than that 
of a year ago. Important factors in the institutional arrangements include the provision 
for negotiated settlements as well as resort to arbitration where negotiations fail. Such 
arrangements, it may be argued, favour the institutionalisation of tlow-ons by way of 
comparative wage justice (Plowman, 1982, pp. 3843 ). Thus, the benchmark role of 
the metal trades agreement will continue to exert an important influence as it did in round 
one. 8 "Decentralised" wage determination will continue to operate by way of awards 
covering large num hers of employees and significant proportions of industries. Thus the 
settlements will be arrived at having regard to macro or generalised solutions rather than 
solutions capable of taking account of more localised contingencies. Such settlements are 
accommodative of comparative wage justice pressures. Arbitrated settlements, giving 
primary consideration to the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes, rather than 
to the Treasury paradigm, will further facilitate award consistency by way of comparative 
wage justice. Thus, the critical factor in terms of the "community standards" for 1982-83 
is likely to be the outcome of the metal trades agreement. Whether this outcome is the 
result of negotiations, or as the result of recourse to arbitration, may also have an impor-
tant impact for any long term movement away from accommodative arbitration to a purer 
collective bargaining variant. 
8 An important difference in Round Two is the Government's stated intention of intervening in major 
a\vard cases. This has resulted frotn the change in Minister of Industrial Relations outlined in the 
ncx t section. 
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There iS' little doubt that the sudden downturn in the metal industry since February 
1982 will influence the outcome of negotiations in two way. First, many employers in the 
industry associate the downturn with the generous provisions of the last agreement. These 
employers will force the Metal Trades Industry Association (MTIA) into a tougher negot-
iating stance with unions this time round. The second factor is the lack of capacity to pay. 
By December 1982, the MTIA estimates that between 50,000/60,000 metal workers 
(about 12 to 1 S percent of the industry's workforce) will have lost their jobs. Indications 
are that those industries upon which the metal trades are dependent - construction, auto-
mobile, white goods, iron and steel - are equally depressed and the estimated job loss may 
be conservative. Employers are bracing themselves for the largest downturn since the Dep-
ression of the 1930s. (Metal Trades Industry Association, 1982) 
It is in this context that the pre-negotiation shots have been fired. The MTIA has asked 
the unions to extend the existing award (i.e. to freeze wage increases) for a further six 
months. It has also demanded that unions take recent tax concessions (see next section) 
into account when negotiating claims. Many employers in the industry have been telexed 
and asked to "communicate to all employees with a view to getting everyone to go to the 
(union) meeting and ensuring that they understand the consequences for (sic) voting for 
the log of claims at this time". Employers have been urged by such telexes to inforn1 emp-
ployees of the level of retrenchments in the industry, the reduction in tariff protection, 
and "dramatic" rises in workers' compensation, payroll tax, electrical and fuel charges. 
Increased labour costs, the employers are urged to. make plain to employees, will increase 
job losses in the industry. 
For its part the Amalgamated Metal Workers' and Shipwrights' Union (AMWSU) (the 
principal of the seven unions party to the award) has responded that the recession and its 
effects have taken place independently of wage movements and that a wages freeze will not 
materially alter employment prospects and structural changes over the next twelve months. 
A reduction in real wages, the union has claimed, will not guarantee no job loses. It has 
put forward a thirteen point log of claims which, in summary form, seeks: 
1. Full maintenance of wages for CPI movements. 
2. Increases in supplementary payments. 
3. A nine day fortnight. 
4. Payment of basic health cover. 
5. Payment of double time for overtime after two hours. 
6. Supply of boots and overalls. 
7. Increase of sick leave to 10 days per year. 
8. Adjustment of tool and other allowances with CPl. 
9. Extension of holiday pay provisions. 
1 0. Paid study leave for shop stewards. 
11. Redundancy pay provisions. 
12. Portability of long-service leave. 
13. No further claims - with certain qualifications. 
A reasonable assessment is that the metal unions (and unions in general) will settle for the 
frrst point, the adjustment of awards rates for CPI movements. At a special conference on 
the economy in September ACTU affiliates resolved that their strategy for 1982-83 would 
be the maintenance of real wages rather than attempts to improve upon existing standards. 
The conference also endorsed the Executive's recommendations that the ACTU coordinate 
wage claims and the use of "increased collective action" in support of key industry unions 
involved in pacesetting negotiations for the next wages round (ACTU, 1982). The 
industries nominated included the metal industry, building and construction, transport, 
waterfront and maritime industries, and storemen in key areas. The ACTU strategy 
includes the use of secondary boycotts, notwithstanding their illegality. On the historical 
evidence it is unlikely that unions will not acheive CPI adjustments. In only three of the 
years since the abandonment of automatic quarterly cost of livtng adjustments in 1953 
have annual earnings increased by less than the CPl. Two of these years were in the index-
ation period. It is unlikely that the metal unions will have a resistance point in their nego-
tiations below projected CPI movements. In the event of the MTIA refusing to agree to 
index wage adjustments a likely outcome will be recourse to arbitration.9 This will result 
9 The MTIA has publicly extolled the virtues of negotiated settlements since the December 1981 
agreement. The praise has become more muted with the economic downturn and the impending 
round of negotiations. 
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in the demise of the "modest degr,ee of liberation of wage setting from the shackles of 
arbitral tribunals" which the Treasury regards so highly. The Treasury index of a "greater 
sense of responsibility in industrial relations" - the no further claims clauses - will be 
another victim of arbitration, or of a negotiated settlement for less than ~CPI adjustments. 
Arguably, even CPI adjustments may be insufficient to enable the no further claims clause 
to be honoured in the more productive sectors of the economy .1 0 
~hould unions be successful in having award rates adjusted for CPI movements, and 
should the Treasury CPI forcasts prove accurate, award increases of 10.75 percent may be 
expected. 
The Politicising of Wage Deterntination 
Political as well as economic uncertainty marks the future. Wage determination in the 
short tern1 is likely to be influenced more by the political and economic elements than by 
any actions of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. The Commission will not 
return to a centralised national wages system without government submissions seeking that 
effect. The "policy of no policy" can be expected to remain the major thrust of the 
Coalition Government. This policy will be tempered by the requirements of a general 
election by the end of 1983. With the highest levels of unemployment since the Depre-
ssion, the absence of any employment growth, high rates of interest and inflation, a pro-
jected mineral and resources boom which has stalled, and no other apparent investment, 
consumer or overs~as stimuli to economic recovery, the present government's political 
stocks are low and the Labor Party's prices and incomes approach a more acceptable 
alternative than might otherwise have been the case in different economic circumstances. 
The Government has publicly pursued an "inflation first'' economic strategy. Yet, for all 
the social and other losses associated with this strategy, inflation, projected at nearly 11 
percent in 1982-83, will not be singularly better than when the Government took office 
eight years ago, and worse than the rate of inflation in many other OECD countries. Con-
trol of inflation will necessitate controls over wages and the Government's policy of 
decentralisation has not borne the expected fruit to date. 
Until the handing down of the recent budget (August 17th) the major area differen-
tiating the major political parties was their approach to wage control. The ·Coalition has 
operated on the basis that the approach argued by the Treasury, the approach of decentral-
isation and de-institutionalising wage determination, would lead to a more "market based" 
outcome. With the abandonment of indexation the Government has attempted to influence 
wage settlements indirectly through monetary and fiscal measures . It has not intervened 
in the industry-by-industry award settlements coming to the Commission for ratification or 
determination. This effectively removed intervention in "the public interest" and, 
arguably, aided the uniform flow-on of the metal industry agreement. This ineffectual 
permissiveness took place in the context of the then Minister for Industrial Relations (Mr 
Viner) publicly calling for an "Americanisation, of Australian collective bargaining. This 
"Americanisa tion '' was to be made more effective by a restructuring of unions. The Mini-
ster prevaricated between the preferred restructuring options - the West German industry 
model or the Japanese enterprise-based model. The "policy of no policy" had been trans-
formed into a naive disregard of the institutional factors accompanying and influencing the 
wage determining process. 
By way of contrast the post-indexation period has seen the Labor Party commit itself 
to economic recovery by way of an economic strategy having a prices and incomes policy 
at its core. Through the National Labor Advisory Council (NLAC), a joint ALP and ACTU 
body, and through other means, it has worked hard to secure ACTU endorsement and 
support for this policy. The Policy commits a Labor government to an extension of the 
Prices Justification Tribunal, the strengthening of the Trades Practices Act to enhance 
10 It has been argued that the no further claims clause was bought by way of large wage increases. 
Less attractive increases may cause more productive sec tors of the metal industry (for example, can 
manufacturing) to seek overaward increases. The caveats included by the AMWSU in its no further 
claims clause may suggest a recognition on its part of the difficulties likely to be encounter,ed in 
getting n1cmbers to honour this con1mitmcnt. 
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union moremcmt and, • part of this policy, was instrum8Jltal in bd 
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previous p1e election tax concessions by the Government had quic y 
a IUI'Char&e added following the election, and to seal its support for the AU' policy ........ 
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In the immediate future, short of the of r , I, ,, t, l • - ' ~ " j .. 1-
Cabinet support for Government tor a retura to Will 
system of wage deter1nination will be very much clepeBdtdlt the teRitl el •• 
election. This may be held in May 1983 thouah a more 1m time ja -'* 1983. It 
is unlikely that the Government will seek to reve~~e i11 eiallt-Jear 1taDd 1 I t oeaa•Hm 
and, quite reasonably, will argue that a lonaer trial petiocl m neceaary to Judie the merita 
of the existing decentralised system. The Govemment is also 11nlikely to try l8d enter bato 
any further tax-wage cone ons. onomtc conamentatms are aareed that the economy 
cannot afford a second ''soft" budget. In being thwuted of its September election option, 
the Government's budget options have been considerably reduced. An eady mini-budget, 
on the pretext that wage negotiations have disregarded the tax is a libly 
possibility. 
Under a Labor government a return to centJalised wage fiXing based upon indexation 
can be expected. Indexation is a major component of the ALP's prices and incomes poUcy 
which, as already noted, is central to that party's economic policy. Notwithstanding any 
potential problems in implementing such a policy, a Labour government, in concert with 
the ACTU, is likely to press the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission for a return to 
indexation. Unlike the present government, a Labour government can be expected to pro-
vide the "supporting mechanisms" which the Commiaion will insist on as ingred-
ients to such a system of wage determination. Thus, over the long haul, the AustJalian 
approach to wage deterntination may come to mirror the political cycle. 
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